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Risk Parameters


Red Bank - Global Params

Param NameValueDescription
Safety Fund Fee Share50%% of protocol revenue that goes to safety fund, the remainder goes to stakers.
Revision1if a chain winds back blocks it should increment revision that is the reason for this blocks timeout for IBC transfer & seconds timeout for IBC transfer
Slippage Tolerance1%this is for swapping protocol revenue into axlUSDC/MARS before sending via IBC to the Mars Hub
Close Factor50%Max % of debt that's liquidatable

Red Bank - Asset Specific Params


Red Bank deposit caps are denominated in the deposit token itself (i.e. 2.5M OSMO)

AssetReserve FactorMax LTVLiquidation TresholdLiquidation BonusDeposit EnabledBorrow EnabledTarget Utilization RateInterest Rate at 0 UtilizationSlope 1Slope 2Deposit Cap

Red Bank - Farm Vaults Specific Params

VaultMax LTVLiquidation TresholdLiquidation BonusDeposit EnabledDeposit Cap
WETH.axl/OSMO LP75%77%12.5%yes500k USDC.axl
WBTC.axl/OSMO LP75%77%12.5%yes250k USDC.axl
USDC.axl/OSMO LP75%77%12.5%yes-
ATOM/OSMO LP73%75%12.5%yes-
stATOM/ATOM LP64%65%15%yes3M USDC.axl


Param NameValueDescription
Swap Fee0.2%The swap fee is the cut of all swaps that goes to the Liquidity Providers (LPs) for a pool. Suppose a pool has a swap fee s. Then if a user wants to swap T tokens in the pool, sT tokens go to the LP's, and then (1 - s)T tokens are swapped according to the AMM swap function.
Exit Fee0%The exit fee is a fee that is applied to LP's that want to remove their liquidity from the pool. Suppose a pool has an exit fee e. If they currently have S LP shares, then when they remove their liquidity they get tokens worth (1 - e)S shares back. The remaining eS shares are then burned, and the tokens corresponding to these shares are kept as liquidity.
Future GovernorNo oneOsmosis plans to allow every pool to act as a DAO, with its own governance in a future upgrade. To facilitate this transition, we allow pools to specify who the governor should be as a string. There are currently 3 options for the future governor. No one will govern it. This is done by leaving the future governor string as blank. Allow a given address to govern it. This is done by setting the future governor as a bech32 address. Lockups to a token. This is the full DAO scenario. The future governor specifies a token denomination denom, and a lockup duration duration. This says that "all tokens of denomination denom that are locked up for duration or longer, have equal say in governance of this pool".
Weights50/50This defines the weights of the pool -
Smooth Weight Change ParamsNAThis allows pool governance to smoothly change the weights of the assets it holds in the pool. So it can slowly move from a 2:1 ratio, to a 1:1 ratio. Currently, smooth weight changes are implemented as a linear change in weight ratios over a given duration of time. So weights changed from 4:1 to 2:2 over 2 days, then at day 1 of the change, the weights would be 3:1.5, and at day 2 its 2:2, and will remain at these weight ratios.
Pool Creation Fee100 OSMOPreset value from Osmosis

External OSMO/MARS Pool Incentives on Osmosis

Param NameValueDescription
Start time (UNIX)When should incentives begin
Duration14How long should a user have MARS locked up for to be able to start claiming incentives (1, 7, or 14 days)
Epoch30How many days should this gauge stay active for
Reward750,000How much total MARS do you want to reward while this guage is active


Red Bank - Asset Specific Params

AssetMax. LTVLiq. LTVLiq. BonusDeposit CapIR Params.OracleDeposit EnabledBorrow Enabled
ATOM68%70%10%150,000 ATOMBase: 0 Slope 1: 0.20 Slope 2: 3 Optimal Util.: 0.70ATOM/USDC from Pythyesyes
axlUSDC74%75%10%500,000 axlUSDCBase: 0 Slope 1: 0.125 Slope 2: 2 Optimal Util.: 0.80USDC from Pythyesyes
NTRN35%40%15%5,000,000 NTRNBase: 0 Slope 1: 0.15 Slope 2: 3 Optimal Util.: 0.60NTRN/ATOM (TWAP) * ATOM/USDC (Pyth)yesyes
stATOM44.5%45%15%50,000 stATOMOptimal Utilization: 60% Base IR: 0% Slope 1: 10% Slope 2: 300%stATOM/ATOM (TWAP) * ATOM/USD (Pyth)yesno